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Organization of American States, while Professor Dupuy describes
the interplay of the United States, the Organization of American
States and the United Nations in the Dominican crisis, primarily
from a factual standpoint, but emphasizing the competition that appeared to exist among these three parties. Perhaps the paper that
will have the widest appeal of all, and that because of its political
overtones and not its legal importance, is that by Dr . Isoart on the
legal position of the United States in Vietnam . In his view the
Geneva Accords brought an end to the war which began in 1946,
and the war in which the United States is involved he regards
as an international conflict between the two Vietnamese Republics,
with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the aggressor, although he emphasizes that the United States refuses to accord to
the authorities in Hanoi any title which would suggest flat they
constitute a state or a government. He is highly aware of the
political issues involved, placing the situation squarely in its setting
as part of the struggle between the United States and China . Dr .
Isoart draws attention to the three contentions of the United States :
(i) South Vietnam is the victim of external aggression, (ii) the
United States is assisting in its legitimate defence, and (iii) the
United States seeks nothing but a peaceful solution of the conflict .
By and large he is not so much concerned with estimating the
validity of the American contentions as explaining the basis on
which they are put forward, and his final conclusion is political
in the extreme. Given the postures of the North and the United
States in 1966 "Les positions semblent bien irréductibles" .
For anyone interested in the French attitude towards international law and what French writers consider important issues
of that legal system, the books under review provide an excellent
guide .
L. C . GREEN *

The Logic of Choice . By G . GOTTLIEB . Galt, Ontario : CollierMacMillan Canada Ltd . 1968 . Pp . 12, 188 . ($6 .60)

Consequences of Utilitarianism . By D. H . HODGSON . 'Toronto :
Oxford University Press . 1967 . Pp . i, 187 . ($5 .95)

One of the key problems in modern jurisprudence is the role of
legal values in judicial decision-making and their compatibility
with judicial concern for social values . Each of these books presents helpful insights into the precise nature of the issue and the
manner in which it might be resolved . However, they deal with
*L . C. Green, of the Department of Political Science, University of
Alberta, Edmonton .
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only pieces of the puzzle and legal philosophy still has a long
way to go in finding some satisfactory answers.
The iurisprudential issue is particuiariy exacerbated at the
present time because judicial decisions involve choices about human conduct which require a selection between competing values .
Modern epistemology suggests that such choices must be irrational
at their very roots. Hence a dichotomy appears established. If
a judge wants-to be rational, scientific and objective, his decision
must be based on purely (and narrowly) legal grounds. If a judge
wishes to be concerned with the wider policy implications of what
he is doing, his reasoning and his decision becomes personal, subjective, non-communicable, and irrational. Recent efforts of legal
philosophers have been directed at closing this gap, at suggesting
that a viable middle way is possible .
Gottlieb has set himself the task of showing how reasoning
with rules can, be denominated "rational" . In accordance with
recent Anglo-American philosophy he rejects the idea that all
forms of reasoning must conform to one _univocal concept of
rationality . Hence, legal reasoning need not be condemned as
irrational simply because it has been amply demonstrated to fall
short of the ideals of quasi-mathematical deduction. It is commonly held now that there are a plurality of logics, each with different standards of rationality, dependent on the field of inquiry
in which they are used . Individual conclusions are judged by the
internal logic appropriate to the area, which itself is justified by
general notions of rationality. Gottlieb is concerned with formulating a logic of choice according to rules, relevant to the fields of
law, morality, and so on .
The most important facet about the logic of reasoning with
rules is that the latter do not express statements of fact, capable
of being true or false. Rather rules guide decisions about action,
they warrant inferences which are required or obligatory, where
there can be a choice of alternatives . Components of rules include
(1) a statement of the circumstances in which the rule is applicable, (2) the type of decisions which ought or may or must be
made, and (3) the type of inference contemplated (permissive,
obligatory, or prohibitory) .
All this is relatively "old-hat" in terms of modern pbilosophical logic. Gottlieb's special contribution is his formulation of, and
concentration on, a key problem in the application of rules. This
is the appropriate type of correspondence between the protasis
of a rule (the general statement of its circumstantial facts) and
the relevant facets of the actual situation. Because rules are generalizations, and because there is a logical gap between a general
statement and a concrete situation, there can never be total correspondence. Yet the relationship cannot be allowed to deteriorate
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into irrelevance either, as sometimes happens in the case of
"mechanical" decision-making . Legal rules are intended to regulate
the human, social activities into which they are inserted, to settle
disputes and channel conduct within a context that has great,
non-legal significance.
Using the example of a rule which prohibits vehicles going
into a park, and a situation where a person drove his car into a
park to take an injured person to the hospital, Gottlieb argues for
a wider kind of rationality in determining the "material" facts to
which the rule must be applied. He asserts that rules should not
be taken as determinative of judgment . Rather they are guides in a
process of reasoning which warrants an inference about the proper
decision . The jump from statement of a general rule to a concrete
decision requires an act of personal judgment which is informed by
a conception of the purpose of the rule . Rules are always designed
to achieve certain ends-in-view and these are the main standards
for assessing the materiality of facts that fall outside the protasis
of the rule. In interpreting, elaborating, and reformulating a rule,
the adjudicator's task should not be conceived of as a search for
a meaning somehow inhering in a rule or statute . Rules are devices designed to guide inferences in making concrete choices .
Hence it is more appropriate to conceive of the decision-maker's
task as making a reasonable choice in the light of what the relevant
rules and their aims authorize.
Gottlieb uses his theory of rule-guided choices to discuss very
capably certain permanent problems of jurisprudence. He deals
with the problem of the proliferation of purposes in interpreting
legal rules, the debate between legal positivism and natural law
about the necessity of moral limitations on the rule of recognition,
and the problem of the judicial role in constitutional adjudication .
In these discussions there are many tantalizing hints thrown out
about the obvious gap in his account. Yet he never does come
firmly to grips with this problem. Gottlieb has given an account of
how judges should reason with rules and, so far as it goes, I agree
with it. However, he has not shown why judges should use rules
at all. He would not convince a policy-oriented theorist who says
judges should not be "guided" by rules in their decisions at all .
If he did attempt to show why reasoning under the authority of
rules is more rational than decision-making without them (in
appropriate cases), then he would have to answer the legal positivist who would claim that accomplishment of these objectives
demands a different logic than that propounded by Gottlieb (in
particular, a non-purposive logic) .
Professor Hodason's book is devoted, in part, to answering the
first of these questions. His inquiry is principally concerned with
an argument against the logical tenability of a utilitarian form of
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ethics . He purports to demonstrate that the acceptance of a utilitarian system of ethical choice is inconsistent with such social
practices as truth-telling or promising. These institutions depend
on an accumulated degree of trust, confidence, and expectation
that the truth will be told, or a promise will be kept, whatever
be the estimate of the consequences at the time for action. He
then argues, convincingly, that an ability to rely on a person
keeping his promises or telling the truth is far more useful than the
consistent application of utilitarianism.
®f far more interest to lawyers is his comparison of the relative
utilities of a utilitarian justification of judicial decisions and the
common law system of justification. Two forms of utilitarianism
can be distinguished, act and rule utilitarianism. The first would
require the judge to justify his decision by inquiring whether his
order would have better consequences than the alternatives available . This has the inevitable disutility of precluding the good
consequences that depend on expectations of certain forms of
conduct.
For instance, a system of punishment is justified mainly by
its deterrent effects. Deterrence, however, is possible only if the
actors rationally believe it will follow convictions. If the judge
is an "act-utilitarian", he will punish the defendant only if he
believes that this has the best consequences on balance. Since
punishment has an obviôns bad effect on the defendant, this
justification can only be the maintenance of the system of deterrence. However, deterrence depends on the expectation of the actor
that the judge will believe the actor expects punishment . But the
actor will expect punishment only if he believes the judge will
feel he expects it, that is, the actor believes that the judge believes
the actor expects it. Because the argument is lost in an infinite
vicious circle, punishment can never be rationally justified.
The only way these expectations can be maintained is for
judges to act on an avowed non-utilitarian) criterion or rule. What
if judges believe that following rules has utility and justify their
decisions by rules, but use only those rules which are justified
by the best general consequences? The difficulty is the uncertainty
as to which rules will have the best consequences, especially in a
rapidly-changing society. Actors will not, at the time they act,
be able to predict what rules will be believed best at the time
their conduct might be disputed and litigated. This is unaffected
by the fact that many cases go to court because of uncertainty
in the relevant law. Still more disputes are settled out of court
and infinitely more situations never become disputed because of
certainty about the rules that would be applied. If the presence
of a case in court were to be taken as an index of the uncertainty
of the prevailing rules, such that they could be ignored by a court
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looking at "policy" considerations, then anyone who was relatively
worse off under a rule would have an incentive to get into court
and have it changed .
Much more debatable is Hodgson's rejection of the thesis that
the good consequences of predictability can themselves be taken
into account in judicial decision-making and weighed against the
substantive gains that might be achieved if an existing rule were
overturned . Hodgson turns the same vicious circle argument
against this variant of rule-utilitarianism. The virtues of predictability depend on an expectation that judges will respect it. However, a utilitarian judge will justify his decisions only in terms of
consequences. The good consequence of predictability, which can
be achieved only i£ the expectations exist, will be sought only if
judges believe it is possible . However, judges can only rationally
believe this is possible if the actors' expectations do exist. But, as
the judges know, these expectations can exist only if the actors
believe the judge will feel they exist, because only then will the
judge take them into account as a good consequence . This vicious
circle renders illogical any attempt to balance the good consequences of aver-ruling against their effects on the certainty in the
law because the latter could not rationally exist .
I do not believe this argument tells against a much more
sophisticated version of judicial activism. I would agree with
Hodgson's conclusions that substantive consequences should not
be the controlling factor in judicial decision-making . Procedural
or legal values should have an independent weight in the calculus
of decisions . Such legal values include predictability but go well
beyond it. The maintenance of a viable legal order and. the appropriate role of adjudication within it may, in the long run,
prove far more important than any short-term substantive gains
we may realize within it.
When. judges do respect the restraints imposed by a legal order,
society gains by the channelling of conduct to avoid disputes, the
settlement of disputes without litigation, the increased efficiency
of courts in directing their minds to those issues which do need
their authoritative disposition, the fairness of equality of results
for litigants in equal positions, and the impersonality and consequent legitimacy which is perceived in judicial decisions . It is
important to note, though, that these are not the only values
that can be achieved in adjudication and that the social results
of the rules that are used cannot be forgotten . Moreover, ~-he
secondary rules, or rules of recognition, which afford authoritative status to the primary rules of law, should not be applied in
a mechanical, unthinking fashion . They have their own. ends-inview, the attainment of the various legal or institutional values
of which the above are examples . As Gottlieb suggests, they should
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be applied in a way which intelligently achieves these purposes in
fact.
For instance, the distinction between the ratio decidendi and
the obiter dictum has as its function the separation of the authoritative rules established by a judicial opinion from the other state
ments which are of persuasive value only. Two purposes seem to
be the object of this device . First, it confines the law-making
powers of courts within limits that are most acceptable in a
democracy . Second, it enhances the substantive quality of the law
they create by capitalizing on the fact that judicial law-making
always operates in a concrete situation within which can be seen
the real implications of what a court is doing. Instead of trying to
devise a mechanical rule differentiating ratio from obiter, we
should recognize that all judge-formulated rules vary along a
spectrum from less to more persuasive to substantially authoritative. The decision as to where a particular rule-proposition in an
opinion fits should be made in the light of the purposes of the
distinction and their implications for the instant problem.
The purposes we seek to achieve through authoritative legal
devices have more or less weight in different circumstances . Taking
the "reckonability" of the legal rules as an example, it is obvious
that in some areas (property, contract, tax) it is more important
than in others (evidence, negligence) . It is less obvious, but
equally true, that in some areas predictability is enhanced, rather
than lessened, by the overturning of an out-dated legal rule. No
one would dispute, either, that the substantive gains to be achieved
from creating new legal rules can vary widely. I suggest that courts
should be able to make an informed judgment about whether these
substantive gains are worth the cost (if any) to the legal values
involved.
Nor do I think such a process is necessarily self-defeating, in
the light of the Hodgson argument. You will remember that he
asserted that a rational, utilitarian judge could not include the
consequences as to the predictability of the law in his calculus of
the consequences of overruling. The good consequences of predictability presupposed citizen expectation of judicial adherence to
old rules, the citizen expectations of adherence presupposed a
belief that judges would feel that the consequences of their own
adherence would be good, but judges would believe this only if
these expectations actually did obtain. Since they would only obtain
if the citizens believed the judges believed they would obtain, a
never-ending vicious circle is set up.
I suggest that a rational judge would make the judgment that
it is desirable that legal values (such as predictability) have great
moment in certain areas. The jurisprudential assumptions of the
judiciary would be known and could be shared by citizens (or
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their lawyers) . At the time of action, if it is important to know
the relevant legal rules, the lawyers can make a rational judgment about the rule that would be applied by the courts :if a litigated dispute arose. They could participate vicariously in the process of reasoning the courts would undergo because they can know
beforehand the standards they would apply. As Gottlieb suggests,
even in areas where no rational ordering of values can be demonstrated, the court can operate according to a pre-established
commitment to priorities found in the constitution, statutory development, legal principles, and community mores.
How should judicial reasoning operate? Courts should not start
by looking at the individual case and its equities, or even. the individual proposed rule and its consequences. Rather, they should
be prepared to act in accordance with the existing rule and
principles, presuming that what has been done before should continue, for reasons of efficiency, incrementalism, and so on . The
onus should be placed on the person wanting a change to show a
clear case for it. Although this is necessary, it is not sufficient .
The substantive gains must be weighed against the procedural
costs. An understanding can be developed about when it is appropriate to overrule decisions in different areas of the law and
lawyers, in planning their clients' actions, can make a rational
judgment about which are the dangerous issues in the law to be
avoided.
To return to the questions left unanswered by Gottlieb, the
reason why decisions according to rules are "rational" is because
only in this way can legal values be achieved . The reason why
a purposive interpretation of decisions, and a process of judicial
development and innovation in the law, is "rational" is because,
in this way, the best mix of institutional and substantive values can
be achieved. I agree with Hodgson that such a system of judicial
justification is not rule-utilitarianism. But it is not his preferred
system of common law justification either and, I submit, is better
than both of these.
PAUL WEILER*

*Paul Weiler, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.

